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BIG DATA: A CASE STUDY OF DISRUPTION AND 
GOVERNMENT POWER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
History is replete with examples of government data collection to support taxation, 
and the targeted delivery of services, as well as repression. The advent of ‘big data’ 
however, has increased the scale, speed, and complexity of data collection and use to 
such an extent, that it is arguably qualitatively different from any analogue 
government record-keeping that has gone before it. If this assumption is correct, it 
represents a radical shift in the balance of power between state and citizen. Further, to 
the extent that the state is sharing data with the private sector, the boundaries of the 
exercise of power implicate corporations also. 
This article first explains the upscaling of data collection to establish that it presents 
an entirely new capability for government. Certainly this has implications for privacy, 
surveillance, and the justice system, however the concern here is the shift in 
government activity that underlies these concerns. Embedding big data in government 
operations masks the deployment of big data as enhancing government power, rather 
than simply facilitating its execution. In other words big data is more than what is 
referred to as ‘sustaining’ technology it is disruptive.1 For this reason, examination of 
the limits of government power is warranted. 
To illustrate this argument, this article examines a selection of recent case studies of 
attempts by the Australian government to deploy big data as a tool of governance. It 
identifies the risk to the citizen inherent in the use of big data, to justify review of the 
bounds of government power in the face of rapid technological change. 
II. BIG DATA 
Historically data have been collected on paper—think the Domesday Book, and 
centuries of church registers recording births, deaths, and marriages—with attendant 
limitations on the application of that data. When only an original exists, and where 
copying involved travel to the site of that original and the skill of the transcriber, there 
was only a narrow scope for data sharing and matching.  
This ‘analogue’ view represents a baseline understanding of the scope of government 
data collection. To the extent that data collection involves technology, the ordinary 
person might comprehend that it principally involves the storage and retrieval of data. 
Indeed government—and large corporations—are constrained in their collection of 
personal information, one form of data, through the operation of the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth) which focuses on the access and control a person has over their own personal 
information, and the use to which personal information might be put. Within this 
framework, a privacy breach tends to be understood as an unauthorised accessing of 
personal information (with attendant misuse or disclosure) or perhaps a request for 
personal information where it is not warranted. 
                                                 
1 ‘Sustaining’ and ‘disruptive innovation’ are terms coined by Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s 
Dilemma (Harvard Business School, 1997). Sustaining innovation permits us to the same work more 
efficiently, while disruptive innovation creates a new type of work altogether. 
Exponential development in digital technologies has however, changed the data 
landscape. Technologies have not simply enhanced the efficiency of collection or 
storage of data: they make possible the generation of ‘big data’ and linkages across 
data sets that have previously not been possible. ‘Big data’ describes a huge data set 
that when analysed, affords insights into trends, patterns and associations, especially 
regarding human behaviour,2 that would be impossible without technology. It is 
qualitatively different from ‘ordinary’ data collection—such as might be envisaged in 
an ‘analogue’ context—through three features: volume, variety, and velocity.3 These 
characteristics refer to the sheer amount of data capable of collection, the number of 
types of data collected, and the speed of processing that data. These features permit 
big data to generate finely grained information about both niche and majority 
populations. Further, it supports the development of artificial intelligence that, 
amongst other things, permits predictions about the subjects of that data.4 Applied 
also through time, the fact of this data, together with the capacity for advanced 
computational analysis and prediction, creates infrastructure with the ability to afford 
real-time understanding of populations and of individuals.  
In the shift from analogue to digital, the advent of big data has expanded the capacity, 
scope, and purpose of government activity in a way that intrudes upon the citizen. 
Commentators have, for example, explored the complex issue of privacy,5 and have 
identified the problems of surveillance.6 Further, the application of artificial 
intelligence in the use of profiling—in criminal and terrorist activities—has attracted 
attention.7 
While these inquiries are important in understanding the implications of big data in 
government, I suggest that there is an additional dimension of interest. The scope and 
potential of big data is so huge, that the way we understand information gathering and 
processing as a function of government is fundamentally altered. Consequently, we 
require a corresponding adjustment in the bounds of the exercise in government 
power both in the collection of data, and in its deployment. 
I preface my comments by pointing out that technology is neither good nor bad. It can 
be applied to achieve any desired end. There is no reason to fear technology per se: 
but as a citizenry we must be cognisant of the implications of technology, including 
when it is put to use by government. So too must the law comprehend the pervasive 
application of data, including big data, in government activities. 
                                                 
2 See eg Seref Sagiroglu and Duygu Sinanc, 'Big Data: A Review' (Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Collaboration Technologies and Systems (CTS), 2013) 42; C L Philip Chen and Zhang 
Chun-Yang, 'Data-Intensive Applications, Challenges, Techniques and Technologies: A Survey on Big 
Data' (2014) 275 (8/10/) Information Sciences 314. 
3 IBM, Paul Zikopoulos and Chris Eaton, Understanding Big Data: Analytics for Enterprise Class 
Hadoop and Streaming Data (McGraw-Hill Osborne Media, 2011), 5. 
4 Daniel E O’Leary, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Big Data’ (March-April 2013) IEEE Intelligent Systems 
96. 
5 Xavier Fijac, ‘Privacy and Self-management Strategies in the Era of Domestic Big Data’ (2013) 32(3) 
Communications Law Bulletin 11. 
6 Melissa de Zwart, Sal Humphreys, Beatrix van Dissel, ‘Surveillance, Big Data and Democracy: 
Lessons for Australia from the US and UK’ (2014) 37(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
713. 
7 Lyria Bennett Moses and Janet Chan, ‘Using Big Data for Legal and Law Enforcement Decisions: 
Testing the New Tools’ (2014) 37(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 643. 
Further, there is no objection, within the norms of effective governance, natural 
justice, and the rule of law, to the collection of information per se. It is reasonable to 
assume that government can only really target and deliver services through at least 
some data collection, and that it may even be reasonable for government to link data 
in its control for the purpose of the execution of its lawful responsibilities. Where this 
has traditionally occurred through analogue processes, the inherent technological 
limitations of data collection have meant that the exercise of government power has 
been (arguably) effectively controlled through administrative law, including more 
recently, albeit weakly, through the Privacy Act. However, big data exponentially 
expands the possibilities or the scope of government operations—putting them 
beyond the contemplation of the existing framework of the law. This raises the 
question of whether existing curbs on executive power are sufficient to comprehend 
the exponentially greater power invested in government through big data. 
III. COMMODITISATION OF DATA 
Big data—rather than simply information about citizens or service users—is now 
assumed integral to government activity. This is clearly illustrated through the 
assumptions underlying the terms of reference of the Productivity Commission 
inquiry into data availability and use.8 The inquiry will ascertain the ‘costs and 
benefits of making more datasets available; examine options for data collection, 
sharing and release; identifying how consumers can benefit from access to data; and 
…consider how to preserve individual privacy and control over data use.’ The 
Inquiry’s terms of reference make a number of assumptions that are instructive in 
understanding institutional comprehension of big data.  
The first assumption is that data is a valuable product. Certainly, data is now a 
commodity more than simply an expression of one’s own information.9 Framing the 
Inquiry around the costs and benefits of making more data available assumes that data 
is necessarily good, and it is economically important as a product on the open market.  
The second assumption is that data should move freely. In other words, where one 
agency or firm holds data, that data should be available to other agencies and firms, 
who can draw on this information to offer better products or services for consumers 
and citizens. The flipside is that there is a cost associated with constraining data, and 
not sharing it freely. The argument seems to be that consumers will get inferior and 
perhaps more expensive products and services if agencies and firms do not have 
sufficient access to data to inform their operations. 
The third premise underpinning the terms of reference is that all data are equal. The 
Inquiry focuses not only on private sector data (such as spending habits, or what 
people search for on the internet), but also on government data about citizens 
(income, health, education data, for example). The Inquiry is therefore to analyse the 
commodification of the data that we share or leave behind as consumers  as well as 
the information we are required to give over to government. The idea of 
commoditisation of data effectively involves us both as consumers and as citizens, 
                                                 
8 Productivity Commission, Data Availability and Use Draft Report (2016). 
9 See eg Paul M Schwartz, 'Property, Privacy, and Personal Data' (2003) 117 Harvard Law Review 
2056. 
becoming a product—or products given that data is aggregated.10 Further, there is 
ostensibly a coming together of government and the private sector in collecting and 
sharing data about the citizen/consumer that represents a shift in power beyond 
government to include other institutions. 
It is true that data—particularly big data—hold many benefits for the public. Public 
health, for example, is reliant on large datasets to gain insights into disease and its 
cause. There is a strong argument also for evidence-based government decisions and 
that evidence can be found through analysing huge amounts of data. However, the 
boundaries of government collection of data and its possible collaboration with the 
private sector are perhaps unclear.  
This is more than a case of ‘function creep’—data collection data for one purpose, but 
application towards additional purposes not originally envisaged. The possibility of 
convergence of all data, from all sources, appears to boost government power and 
with it, a validation of power exercised by corporations over the citizen. Without 
starting to examine questions of personal privacy arising from the purpose to which 
the data will be put, the fundamental issue in conceptual terms, is that of a breach of 
privacy through the initial collection and sharing of that data. 
As evidenced by the terms of reference of the Productivity Commission Inquiry, 
government involvement in big data, and its commoditisation, appears to be assumed 
as a foundational position. These assumptions are reflected in recent misadventures in 
government deployment of its data and associated systems. 
IV. GOVERNMENT DEPLOYMENT OF BIG DATA: CASE STUDIES 
The Australian government’s quest for agility and innovation in the face of digital 
disruption11 has seen it embark on some high profile projects that highlight the need 
to question government relationship with big data. In particular, the following 
sections will analyse the 2016 census and the ongoing program of Centrelink data 
matching relating to social security recipients. 
A. #Censusfail 
In the lead up to the 2016 Census, the government was accused of function creep 
through plans to link the resulting data with data from other government agencies. 
Further, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (‘ABS’) also planned to link an 
individual’s data from one Census into the future to gain a lifelong picture of that 
person. While the ABS has always provided a service of selling various datasets in 
various forms, it made clear that the additional functions would assist it to monetise 
the data collected.12 Collectively, these changes represent a significant incursion into 
citizens’ private lives. 
                                                 
10 Yvonne de Souza, ‘Not Just Data: Privacy in the Digital Age (2014) 60(5) Feliciter 17. 
11 Australian Government, National Innovation and Science Agenda Report (2015). 
12 Natasha Bita, ‘Census 2016: ABS Bosses Discussed Secret Plans to Crossmatch Private Data’ 
Courier Mail (online) 8 August 2016 <http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/census-2016-abs-bosses-
discussed-plans-to-crossmatch-private-data/news-story/5770de257b4ab56a6a3039dad0e0bcfa>. 
The first indicator of this incursion, arguably, was the ABS plan to retain names 
disclosed in the Census, with no destruction date.13 In the face of criticism about the 
proposal, the ABS backed down, indicating that it would retain names until the earlier 
of 2020 or until no longer required. 
 
One of the questions about the retention of names was whether they amounted to 
‘statistical information’ for the purposes of s 8(3) of the Census and Statistics Act 
1905 (Cth) (‘Act’). This provision reflects the power afforded by s 51(xi) of the 
Australian Constitution to enact legislation with respect to ‘census and statistics’. The 
ABS website states that names are collected in the Census to14 ‘assist householders 
completing the form to report the relevant information for each person and to ensure 
the Census covers the entire population and data is of high quality.’ Relevantly, the 
purpose of collecting names is to ‘enhance the value of Census data, by combining it 
with other national datasets to better inform government decisions in important areas 
such as health, education, infrastructure and the economy.’ This last purpose reflects 
the increasing importance of big data in government business. 
 
On a reading of the statute however, names are not ‘statistical information’. The 
stated purposes for collecting names are secondary to the purpose empowered under 
the Act and beyond the power afforded by the Constitution. It is a logical 
inconsistency to have a process by which to ascertain the entire population, yet 
relying on names to ‘ensure that the Census covers the whole population.’ If that 
entire population were already known (ostensibly by name) then there would be no 
need for a census. The purpose of collecting names arguably goes beyond even the 
permitted bounds of government power. 
 
The second indicator of the creep of government power relates to privacy—although 
not only the potential loss of personal information once it is collected. The argument 
here is that a breach of privacy occurs at the very point of collection, regardless of 
how securely one’s personal data is maintained.  
 
Australia has no (or very limited) common law right to privacy15 and has no bill of 
rights. There is therefore little systematic, strong protection for Australians against the 
exercise of State power through data collection.16 It is therefore imperative that 
Australians do not easily give up any of the ad hoc protections they have; and that 
they are not required through force of law to empower State encroachment into 
personal freedoms. This is the most concerning aspect of the reach of the ABS 
through lateral and longitudinal data linkage. 
 
                                                 
13 ‘ABS Response to Privacy Impact Assessment’ Australian Bureau of Statistics Media Release, 18 
December 2015. 
14 Australian Bureau of Statistics, About the Census, ‘Privacy, Confidentiality, Security’ 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/privacy>.  
15 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice’ 
Report No 108 (2008); Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Serious Invasions of Privacy in the 
Digital Era’ Report No 123 (2014), [3.53]-[3.58]. 
16 The ABS has visibly exercised its power including via its field officers. Frequently individuals have 
perceived this – sometimes ‘threatening’ – exercise of power as sending a message that conflicts with 
the ABS’s advertised position. See Kate Galloway, ‘Troubles with #CensusFail’ Storify (15 September 
2016) <https://storify.com/katgallow/troubles-with-censusfail>.  
Without entering into concerns about the potential for data breaches or the possibility 
of deployment for surveillance, through this system the State has removed 
Australians’ individual capacity to establish and maintain boundaries between the 
State and citizen. This ‘breathing space’ would otherwise allow people to be 
themselves, guided by their social interactions and value systems, and free to become 
engaged citizens away from the gaze of the State. Becoming an engaged citizen is 
regarded by some as the very nature of privacy,17 and by others as a type of privacy.18 
As Solove points out: 
 
The activities that affect privacy are not necessarily socially undesirable or worthy of 
sanction or prohibition. … In many instances, there is no clear-cut wrongdoer, no 
indisputable villain whose activities lack social value.19 
Government promises to protect privacy are important, but miss an essential issue 
with the ABS plans for data linkage now available through big data: once we have 
given our information, our privacy has already been breached. Further, if the State 
demands our information under threat of punishment, citizens’ privacy is breached 
before they have given over any information at all. By contrast, the State’s 
understanding of ‘privacy’ suggests that it will protect us from interlopers’ misuse of 
collected data without acknowledging that tracking citizens through their lives is a 
breach in the first place.20  
 
While a discussion about privacy is important, it does not necessarily engage with the 
extent of government power to collect data in the first place, or the scope of the 
potential use of that data. In many cases, it focuses on the potential for unauthorised 
data leakage, for example, by hacking. Instead, I suggest that the advent of big data 
represents a qualitative shift in the very idea of information collection. To collect with 
the purpose in mind of data linkage, data aggregation, data mining, and artificial 
intelligence expands the reach of government power in ways not previously available 
in an analogue understanding of government activity, for purposes and through 
processes that are currently unknown and possibly unknowable. The asymmetry of 
power relations as between government and citizen means that the citizen cannot 
know how this data is going to be processed and used.21 
 
Data collection and its aggregation and use as big data, challenges the foundational 
assumptions of the bounds of state power, and should therefore be addressed by 
policy-makers and Parliament before addressing additional questions of privacy once 
government has access to citizens’ personal information. 
 
                                                 
17 Julie E Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code and the Play of Every Day Practice 
(Yale University Press, 2012). 
18 Daniel J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 (3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
477. 
19 Ibid 559.  
20 This point is made in the data retention context in Paul Bernal, ‘DRIP: A Shabby Process for a Shady 
Law’ Paul Bernal’s Blog: Privacy, Human Rights, Law, The Internet, Politics, More (12 July 2014) 
<https://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2014/07/12/drip-a-shabby-process-for-a-shady-law/>. 
21 This is borne out by the increasing incidence of departmental releases of personal information to 
‘correct the record’ following public criticisms of the Centrelink ‘robo-debt’ processes. See eg 
‘Editorial: Inhuman Services’ The Saturday Paper (11 March 2017) 
<https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/2017/03/11/inhuman-services/14891508004333>.  
The third instructive feature of the Census incident is the adoption by the ABS of the 
language of efficiency and public interest in justifying the changes. This language 
reveals the government view of data collection as an activity that naturally falls within 
its scope. It implicitly acknowledges that change is afoot—otherwise the activity 
would not rate mention. It seeks to justify change however, without articulating the 
exponential shift in the nature and consequences of government data collection. It 
fails to mention the disruption to governance that is wrought by big data. 
 
Adopting the language of neoliberalism has the ring of authority and ‘common sense’. 
Who, after all, would seek inefficient government processes? However, while 
collecting and retaining our names along with our personal information may be 
efficient, this rationale for expansion of data collection does not address the 
foundation question of whether citizens retain the privacy that constitutes them as 
members of a liberal democratic society, or whether the collection of this information 
is a warranted exercise of state power. This is amplified because of the vastly 
expanded use to which data can now be put. 
 
For all the preparation, obfuscation,22 and justification of the ABS, on census night 
technology took its own course. Rather than a realisation of the scope of government 
power, the failure of the much-hyped online census form and the possibility of denial 
of service attacks on the ABS website, caused widespread public concern about the 
possibility of data breach—the ‘privacy’ issue that had attracted more widespread 
concern than the government’s function creep. Yet the IT failure itself—attributed to 
budget cuts, lack of staff, lack of resources, and poor planning23—provides a further 
caution about government’s entrée into big data. With the great power attendant upon 
contemporary and likely future data processing, comes the need for great skill as well 
as great responsibility. Neither of these were in evidence in #censusfail. Worryingly, 
there is further evidence that government remains ill-equipped to be trusted with 
data.24 
 
B. Centrelink—#notmydebt 
Following the disastrous foray into big data in the census, the public has become 
aware of what appears to be further government over-reach in data linking. Since 
December 2016, Australian media has been flooded with stories of people apparently 
wrongly subjected to Centrelink debt recovery processes.25 Centrelink is Australia’s 
department responsible for assessing and dispensing social security payments. As a 
consequence of its apparent wrong-headed deployment of big data, its customers are 
claiming that they are being wrongfully threatened with legal action for failure to pay 
debts that do not exist. 
                                                 
22 The Senate Committee that investigated how the Census was conducted found that the changes 
warranted more public consultation and external scrutiny than it received, although it also confirmed 
that the ABS had not acted beyond its powers. See: Senate Economics References Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, 2016 Census: Issues of Trust (2016), 38.   
23 Ibid. 
24 See eg Stilgherrian, ‘Census Reports Highlight Government IT Incompetence’ ZDNet (25 November 
2016) <http://www.zdnet.com/article/census-reports-highlight-government-it-incompetence/>.  
25 #NotMyDebt (2016) <https://www.notmydebt.com.au/>. 
Since mid-2016, Centrelink has matched its data with data held by the Australian 
Taxation Office (‘ATO’). The intention, as stated by the Minister,26 is to use it to 
uncover inconsistencies between what a person declares to Centrelink, and what they 
declare to the ATO. Centrelink can then use this information to recover any 
overpayment. However, the way government has set up the data linking is to match 
the fortnightly Centrelink payments against annual reported taxable income. The 
annual taxable income has been averaged over the year—with a high likelihood of an 
inaccurate picture of what a person received each fortnight through the year. For 
example, if a person was unemployed for six months and receiving benefits, but 
employed for the second six months in a high paying job, the six months of income 
will show up as averaged payments fortnightly for the entire year. That person will be 
asked to prove their Centrelink entitlement by producing pay slips for the period of 
employment. If unable to do so, Centrelink will claim repayment. 
The result has been a large number of reported discrepancies that are readily 
explainable. Unfortunately for Centrelink clients however, the department requires 
payment within time limits that expire before the client can offer an explanation. 
The Minister denies that there is a problem, reiterating that the system is doing what it 
was designed to do. He points out that it is recovering a lot of overpayments.27 While 
this may be the case, this statement masks as much as it reveals. Many people for 
example, have indeed ultimately been found to owe some money. However according 
to the cases recorded on the website notmydebt.com.au, many who were initially 
charged with huge debts, sometimes thousands of dollars, were ultimately found to 
have owed only hundreds or very little at all. Further, because of the requirement to 
pay a ‘debt’ in advance of proving otherwise, it is anticipated that many people either 
failed to provide a defence, or were unable to. In these cases, the government will 
have recovered money by default without establishing entitlement to it. 
There are of course, processes available for review of Centrelink debt assessments. 
However, customers have been told to commence repayment of the debt while they 
collect the evidence to disprove Centrelink’s debt claim. This may consist of 
gathering pay slips from former employers, for example. 
Centrelink’s approach does two things: first, it places an immediate (and in many 
cases, unjustified or even incorrect) financial burden on the customer while secondly, 
placing the onus of proof of the absence of debt on the customer. In light of the likely 
vulnerability of so many of Centrelink customers, this is a heavy burden indeed. 
Importantly, the government’s deployment of big data processes fails here to meet 
criteria of natural justice and transparency that are a hallmark of good government. 
Natural justice requires a government decision-maker to make decisions that afford 
procedural fairness in carrying out their legislated responsibility.28 While this does 
                                                 
26 Sarah Martin, ‘Welfare Debt Squad Hunts for $4bn in Over-payments’ The Weekend Australian 
(online) 5 December 2016 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/welfare-debt-squad-
hunts-for-4bn-in-overpayments/news-story/e19c5b0d4a39aa07364a41269fdc11c9>. 
27 Joe Kelly, ‘Alan Tudge Claims Labor’s Centrelink Debt Victims Did Owe Money’ The Australian 
(online) 26 January 2017 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/alan-tudge-claims-labors-
centrelink-debt-victims-did-owe-money/news-story/94f339427d94460d9b4f8127e919d1c1>. 
28 Robert Lindsay, ‘Natural Justice: Procedural Fairness’ (2011) 38(1) Brief 10, 13-14. 
not mean necessarily that the resulting decision is fair, it does require fairness in the 
process by which that decision is made. Comments in the media, for example, will 
often cite the hardship of a client in having to repay money without establishing that 
the money is not in fact owed. My argument does not relate to these people, as 
difficult or tragic as some circumstances may be. Instead, it is the large proportion of 
people targeted, deliberately according to the Minister, by mismatched data that 
represents a breakdown in standards of governance. 
Considering the number of claims Centrelink deals with annually, it is entirely likely 
that the Department or its algorithm will make mistakes. Procedural fairness then, 
would require that the customer have a clear process for having that decision 
reviewed according to law. Unlike the possibility of the odd human (or computer) 
error, what differs about the Centrelink situation is the scale of the issue—the volume 
characteristic of big data. 
In the first place, Centrelink is now finding 20,000 debts a week instead of its 
previous (manually-determined) average of 20,000 debts a year.29 Additionally, one 
Centrelink source is reported to have said that of ‘the hundreds of cases they had 
reviewed, only about 20 (at a “generous estimate”) turned out to be genuine debts.’30 
A huge increase in the number of debts and a significant proportion of those 
apparently ‘false positives’ points to a significantly flawed system, rather than a few 
outliers. Because of the scale of the problem, it might be said that the source of 
procedural unfairness lies within system for determining the debt in the first place.  
To compound the issue of procedural fairness, the National Audit Office has found 
that ‘nearly a quarter of the 57 million phone calls made to Centrelink [in 2014] went 
unanswered and that Australians spent 143 years waiting in vain to speak to 
Centrelink in 2013-2014, before simply hanging up…’31 In other words, it is not easy 
to get in touch with the department if you have been issued with a demand to pay. For 
citizens who through disadvantage of one kind or another do not have the knowledge, 
resources, or resilience to battle the system, the consequences of an absence of 
procedural fairness are compounded. 
Big data managed properly is entirely likely to bring benefits for government and 
citizen alike. But blindly following the lure of data without recognising the effects on 
human services and the foundations of the rule of law, interferes with the purpose of 
government itself at the cost of the citizen. 
If the evidence about consumer experience of the Centrelink robo-debt program is 
true—and there certainly appears to be a lot out there—then it seems that the system 
is poorly designed to achieve its stated purpose of recovering money owed to the 
government. However, the Minister has been very clear—the system is working 
                                                 
29 Christopher Knaus, ‘Centrelink Officer Says Only a Fraction of Debts in Welfare Crackdown Are 
Genuine’ The Guardian (online) 23 December 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2016/dec/23/centrelink-officer-says-only-a-fraction-of-debts-in-welfare-crackdown-are-
genuine>. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Noel Towell, ‘Centrelink Blocks 60,000 Calls a Day, Blames Smartphone Apps’ Sydney Morning 
Herald (online) 23 October 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/government-it/centrelink-blocks-
60000-calls-a-day-blames-smartphone-apps-20151023-gkgmeo.html>. 
exactly as it was designed to do so.32 On this basis then, we must assume that the 
government has purpose-built a big data system that will incorrectly raise debts. In the 
absence of an accurate understanding of the boundaries of government power, there is 
no check on the potential abuse of the deployment of data. 
In support of the argument that this is a question of governance, the former head of 
the government’s Digital Transformation Office, Paul Shetler, has commented on the 
government’s succession of IT failures—including #censusfail and Centrelink—
describing them as ‘cataclysmic’ and ‘not a crisis of IT’ but a ‘crisis of 
government’.33  
The Centrelink debacle—in particular when viewed together with the government’s 
other ill-conceived attempts at implementing digital services—demands an urgent and 
radical rethink about the nature of process of the exercise of state power in the face of 
pervasive digital technologies. To address this dissonance, Shetler has called for a 
‘radical upgrade’ of IT skills in government. Similarly, Neuzerling attributes 
Centrelink’s failure to ‘data illiteracy’.34 These assessments are entirely correct, 
although as intimated in Shelter’s Guardian interview,35 better digital capabilities 
must also pervade organisational culture. I would argue that beyond this, the law itself 
must clearly articulate the boundaries of state power in the face of digital 
transformation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
So is the government insufficiently competent to implement new technologies to 
serve the public? Or is it sufficiently competent to design a system that undermines 
natural justice in the exercise of government power? Either way, the law must hold 
government to account for the fallout. 
Our complex and interconnected world functions on data. To gain the benefits data 
has to offer, there is a trade-off: a new kind of social contract. In exchange for giving 
up some of our privacy, we might have easy access to highly valuable goods and 
services. But we must also be clear about the costs—not costs to enterprise or 
government, and not only the economic costs to us as ‘consumers’. We need to know 
the cost in terms of our relations with government itself.  
The tussle between the exercise of executive power and the citizen’s freedom and 
integrity is as old as government itself. Over centuries, our legal system has 
developed constraints on government action in recognition of the immense power it 
holds, and the adverse effects the exercise of naked power will have on the citizen. 
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Consequently, we have developed a sophisticated understanding of the very nature of 
government—as an institution whose sole purpose is in service of the citizen. 
Therefore, while government may be entitled to recover overpaid welfare payments, 
or may offer benefits through census data collection, it is not entitled to do so in a 
way that prejudices the wellbeing and freedoms of the citizen. As new tools come into 
existence—and in contemporary terms, these tools are digital technologies and big 
data—it is the responsibility of government to develop processes that harness these 
tools in the service of the citizen. Instead, we see their deployment as a crude exercise 
of power. Whether these tools have deliberately targeted citizens, or whether they 
have been deployed in ignorance, the ill-conceived Centrelink data matching process 
in particular demonstrates government that has lost its way. Yet whether government 
can be effectively constrained in its exercise of power is another question. 
It is clear that until government grapples with the social, governance, and legal 
implications of digital technologies, the citizen remains at threat of unwarranted 
exercises of government power. This is indeed a ‘crisis of government’. It is now up 
to the public to make this a crisis for government (for all and any government) until 
the boundaries of power are recalibrated for a digital world. 
 
